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SECTOR

Beyond the Veneer of Strategic
Philanthropy
Patricia Patrizi, M.S.S., Patrizi Associates; and Elizabeth Heid Thompson, B.A.,
Independent Consultant

Key Points
· “Strategic philanthropy” has become a dominant
theme among foundations in the past few decades.
· While many foundations have developed strategic
plans, few have made the internal changes necessary to actually behave strategically.
· Four challenges to strategic philanthropy are identified, including strategies developed in isolation
from grantees that execute them and misaligned
foundation structures, processes, and cultures
that do not support strategic endeavors.
· In order to get beyond the veneer of strategic
philanthropy, foundation leaders need to be clearer
about their own role in creating change, develop
the strategic capacities to do so, and then apply
those capacities, learn from them, and improve
them over time.

concern that in extreme strategic philanthropy
can be overly controlling and “reduce nonprofits
to contractors” (Dorfman, 2008). They also assert
that foundations tend to remain too distant to be
sufficiently knowledgeable about what happens
“on the ground.” Proponents believe that strategic
philanthropy lends more focus and alignment to
endeavors and therefore offers a greater likelihood of impact.
These observers have argued persuasively about
both the potential strengths and weaknesses of
strategic philanthropy. We posit an alternative
discourse – that strategic philanthropy has been
only partially conceived, let alone implemented,
in most foundations. At this time, a definitive assessment on the merits of strategic philanthropy
would be based on what we believe is only partial,
and for that matter, fairly weak, implementation.

Introduction

The Veneer of Strategic Philanthropy

Over the past few decades, foundations have
taken up “strategic philanthropy” with a vengeance. By doing so, they seek not only to provide
grant support to nonprofits, but to assess social
problems, develop strategies to solve them, and
track the results of their efforts.

Most foundations have adopted only the veneer
of strategic philanthropy. A look at foundation
board books will reveal its trademarks – theories
of change or logic models, strategy papers, performance metrics, trustee-friendly dashboards.
Yet, these elements alone do not make foundations strategic, nor are they enough for strategic
philanthropy.

Recently, debates within the field have raised
substantial questions regarding the value of
strategic philanthropy.1 Some have raised the

In a qualitative study we conducted for the Evaluation Roundtable (Patrizi & Thompson, 2008),
For example, Paul Brest and William Schambra debate at a
2008 Philanthropy Roundtable meeting and Brest and Sean we asked senior foundation staff how they think
Stannard-Stockton's session on “Strategic Philanthropy and about, learn about, and develop a strategy. Many
Effective Grantmaker-Grantee Relationships” at the Grant- of those interviewed acknowledged that their
1

makers for Effective Organizations’ 2010 conference.
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foundations were struggling to realize the promise of strategic philanthropy, and they expressed
frustration with current approaches. As one said,
it has become “more of an academic exercise than
anything else.” Another noted: “We just got done
with a two-year strategic planning cycle, but now
we don’t know where to start.” Others thought
that strategy belonged more to the consultants
producing them than to the foundations themselves. Strategies were faulted as tactical execution plans that specify the future behaviors of
outside players and assume the world will align
itself accordingly.
It’s not that practitioners dismissed outright their
attempts to be more strategic. Most strategies
were considered potentially useful. But all were
said to suffer from a common malady: failure to
adapt to issues on the ground.
Without question, foundations produce “strategies.” But the efforts do not extend to changes
within the foundations themselves, thereby
leaving few as capable strategic organizations. If
we consider the baseline position from where
most foundations started – what the Center for
Effective Philanthropy calls a “charitable banker”
(Center for Effective Philanthropy, 2007) – few
have considered the implications of what it takes
to evolve into a fully strategic foundation.
We see many foundations acting as if they can
adopt this fundamentally new role without changing the operations, culture, competencies, and
structure of the foundation itself. They fall into a
natural trap, adopting the veneer of strategic philanthropy without making the deeper institutional
changes needed to support it.
In brief, many foundations fall short of being
effective because they seek to change what they
do without considering how they do it. Form
doesn’t follow function, and we believe it has
consequences for how effective a foundation can
become in its strategic endeavors.

Four Challenges Foundations Face in
Adopting Strategic Philanthropy
To help foundations improve their approaches
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to strategy, we convened the Strategy Forum in
May 2008, working on behalf of the Evaluation
Roundtable.2 Senior staff from 28 foundations
gathered at the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
in Princeton, N.J., for a three-day effort to tackle
these tough issues (Appendix).
Based on what we learned at the Strategy
Forum, as well as our own experience conducting program strategy evaluations and creating
assessment systems for foundations, we believe
that foundation leaders must address four key
challenges to their efforts to be more strategic and
more effective.

Many foundations fall short of being
effective because they seek to change
what they do without considering
how they do it.
Challenge 1: Strategy Planning Is Separated
From Doing
We’ve found that many foundations make the
mistake of approaching strategy development
as an upfront, analytic exercise that ends when
implementation begins.
After an initial burst of strategic planning, grants
are made; staff then move on to making new
grants or developing other strategies. “Strategy”
as such is for the most part viewed as a document
prepared early on, not a process that needs to be
refined based on experience. “For us, strategy is a
piece of paper,” is how one foundation staff person
put it – underscoring how inert the treatment of
strategy can be.
Yet many in philanthropy know well the complexity involved in their work. They know there
The Evaluation Roundtable is a community of practice
that has been meeting consistently since 1988. Originally
developed as a way for evaluation directors to learn from
each other, membership has expanded to include senior
management and program and communication staff. Patricia Patrizi directs the Roundtable.
2
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are few certainties regarding many foundationsupported interventions. They know that what is
first conceived in a document will need to evolve
quickly when it hits the wall of reality. They increasingly understand how context-bound success
really is. They also know that any intervention
supported by a foundation inevitably occurs in
the context of many other such interventions, and
that effects imagined during planning are likely to
be very different in practice. In reality, implementation never goes as planned. If anything can and
should be anticipated in planning, it is that most
of what has been planned will necessarily change.

What is missed in the prevailing
practice of planning is the critical
role a foundation can and should
play in developing strategy as it is
executed.
Despite recognizing these realities, many foundations still approach planning as though the
work they do is predictable, conflict does not
exist, leveraged resources will just happen, and
interventions can be “taken to scale” without
adaptation to groups or circumstances. In other
words, foundations plan as though plans actually
materialize as they were written.
The emphasis on upfront planning is understandable for two reasons. First, some of the “determinism” in foundation planning may be a reaction to
a past in which some foundations made grants
with little regard to the likely effectiveness of either their strategies or the work of their grantees.
In this light, hyperrational planning behavior
can be viewed as a reasonable reaction to past
practices that could be called highly irrational.
The relative ease with which foundations can
squander resources is a serious problem, and
many foundations have emphasized planning and
metrics to prevent it. Second, many foundations
rely on the planning discipline to stay on top of
what constitutes effective practice. Yet in these
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pursuits, foundations often learn less about the
issues that matter – what happens once grants are
made.
What is missed in the prevailing practice of
planning is the critical role a foundation can and
should play in developing strategy as it is executed. For example, performance metrics have
an important place – when you know enough to
identify what to measure and how to measure
it. Performance metrics require a solid understanding of exactly how implementation should
occur and what measures will indicate success. In
business, most performance metrics emerge from
statistical analysis of process variance. But this
is almost never the case for foundation strategies, especially not at their outset. The result can
be metrics imposed based upon nothing more
than mere speculation, with no grounding in real
experience.
Implementation is too complex to assume that
strategy can be developed at just one point in
time and remain fixed. The world does not stay
constant. At the Strategy Forum, Michael Quinn
Patton explained the fallacy of this assumption by citing Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth
Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke’s perspective on
military strategy: “No battle plan ever survives
contact with the enemy.” Research into the failure
of implementation is legion (e.g., Pressman &
Wildavsky, 1980). Whether in military, corporate, or foundation settings, strategy development requires ways to learn from action on the
ground. As Henry Mintzberg, one of the foremost
corporate strategists, advised Strategy Forum
participants: “You don’t plan a strategy; you learn
a strategy.” This is not a license for foundations
to make funding decisions without a sufficient
examination of what has been tried in the past
and learning from those experiences. Rather, that
alone is insufficient.
What is often missing is real learning about strategy execution. A recent survey we conducted for
the Evaluation Roundtable identified post-grant
collection and use of award information as the
single weakest area of foundation learning.
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Strategists must stay alert to execution as strategy
encounters the outside world. Too often foundations rely on performance metrics, dashboards, or
other tools that are woefully inadequate for learning about strategy and what happens as a strategy
moves beyond concept and into implementation.
Although these tools can be useful in tracking
progress toward achieving a goal, they offer little
insight or guidance on why things go wrong, as
they inevitably do. These methods provide little,
if any, information about what is working or not.
Foundations need to become better at learning
how their strategies are being executed. They
need the information that can inform them about
how to adapt their strategies to better meet the
changing reality on the ground. They then need
the ways, time, and incentives to put this information to good use.
Learning is important not because it allows
foundation staff to accumulate knowledge. It’s
important because strategy success depends on it.
Challenge 2: Whose Strategy Is It, Anyway?
Not only are plans often separated from implementation, they’re often developed in isolation
from those doing the work – the grantees supported to execute the strategy. It is difficult to
think of a setting where it would be good practice
for an organization to develop a plan that others
would carry out. Yet this is precisely what we do
to our grantees.
Even when grantees are included in planning,
they’re rarely seen as full partners in the process, with considerable sweat equity, reputation,
careers, and institutional capital on the table.
Consider the five stages for building shared vision
described by Bryan Smith of Innovation Associates: telling, selling, testing, consulting, and cocreating (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, & Smith,
1994, p. 314).
At best, the engagement between funders and
grantees around strategy tends to be one of
consulting. At worst, it is closer to mere telling.
Foundations typically bring grantees to the table
either so early in the process that the discussion
is necessarily general, or so late in the process
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that the strategy is fully formed and only grantee
agreement is sought. The most fertile opportunities for interaction between grantees and foundations – often around the thorny and pivotal issues
related to the realties of implementation – are
lost.

The less trust we have in our
partners, the more likely we are to
micro-monitor them and require
more data and reporting.
Further complicating foundation learning is the
power imbalance between foundations and their
grantees, which inevitably distorts information
flow and impedes feedback, particularly around
what is not working. Overcoming this dynamic
requires the time and trust to build a mutual
understanding of and commitment to each other’s
agenda. There is a wealth of contract research
showing that the less trust we have in our partners, the more likely we are to micro-monitor
them and require more data and reporting. Such
irrelevant monitoring activities rarely succeed
in building knowledge (just consider how many
grantee reports go unread!). Worse yet, they can
lead to more mistrust and stalemated decisions
about how to take important corrective action
when needed.
A frequent result is weak strategy. Another is
inadequate grantee understanding of foundation
work. In our interviews, foundation leaders readily acknowledged that “grantees don’t understand
our strategy.” Although many downplay this issue
as merely a “communication problem,” we think it
goes to the more central issue of whether foundations know how to create real working partnerships with grantees in the strategic enterprise.
Grantees need to be treated as the central
partners that they ultimately are in the strategy
process. They are not only the main executors of
strategy, but have the on-the-ground knowledge
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and experience essential to sort the wheat from
chaff in strategic thinking. We doubt if many
foundations would dismiss key grantee partners
as essential for successful strategy execution. Yet
the lack of real partnership hampers the work of
many, if not most, foundations. One reason for
the strategic estrangement between funder and
funded is that some foundations believe fuller
engagement will obligate them to work in this
way with all their grantees, or will lead to so many
cooks that the result is a strategic muddle worse
than what they already encounter. So too, behind
much of this is the desire to avoid conflict. Our
experience tells us, however, that the conflict is
not avoided; it is simply postponed to the time
when serious implementation issues arise.

Grantees need to be treated as the
central partners that they ultimately
are in the strategy process.
While we don’t advise or expect foundations to
include every grantee in every aspect of their
strategy work, we do believe foundations need
a core set of partners in strategy development,
negotiation, and debate – partners who have the
experience and knowledge necessary for successful implementation and who can productively
challenge foundation assumptions. This will take
time that some, and likely many, foundations
believe they don’t have. But we know, from our
interviews and work with foundations evaluating
strategies, that the lack of genuine engagement
between key grantees and funders on strategic
issues in the end hurts funders nearly as much as
grantees and makes strategic success less likely.
Foundations cannot afford to treat these real and
inevitably crucial strategic partners as passive
entities in the strategy-development process.
Challenge 3: Does Your Organization Support
Your Strategy?
This fundamental shift for a foundation – from
banker to strategist – rarely has triggered an
examination of how it needs to change its orga-
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nization – the people, structure, resources, and
processes to support its strategy work.
We’ve often observed foundations aiming to be
agile, flexible, and capable of quickly responding
to strategic challenges . . . then doing none of the
above once the strategy rolls out. Why does this
happen? Clues emerged at the Strategy Forum,
where the conversation made clear that foundations’ ambitious goals are often at odds with the
ways they structure and manage themselves.
We found that the structure-strategy conflict
often arises because foundations find themselves
divided between two organizational types: the
bureaucracy on the one hand, and what Mintzberg (2007) calls the “adhocracy” on the other.
These are two fundamentally different models,
each with a distinct – and often diametrically
opposed – set of values, decision-making rules,
and management styles. According to Mintzberg,
adhocracies are highly organic organizational
forms with little formalization of behavior, roles,
and expectations, whereas bureaucracies embrace
traditional hierarchical modes of authority with
highly formalized behavior, roles, and expectations.
The tension between the two models is perhaps
clearest when we consider how foundations approach their two main functions: grants administration (suited to bureaucracy) and program strategy (suited to adhocracy). In this bimodal system,
grants-management staff require a great deal of
regimentation, whereas program staff require the
freedom to innovate and pursue entrepreneurial
instincts. Grants management requires strong, reliable systems that operate in fixed ways at regular
intervals in a highly static context. Program
strategy is the opposite: It requires innovation,
adaptation, and learning in a constantly evolving
context.
How, then, does foundation management
typically respond to an organization containing
conflicting pressures to exert bureaucratic control
and provide enormous freedom? They respond
as managers have responded for centuries – by
focusing management resources and systems on
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creating high levels of control over that which
is, or appears to be, controllable (Perrow, 1986).
In short, bureaucracy dominates. Repeatedly,
we have seen the grants process and accounting
procedures monopolize management attention
and institutional schedule. In turn, boards often
grow to expect the same certainty from program
staff that financial and grants management staff
can offer.
And foundation information systems tend to be
far better structured for processing grant applications, payment, and reporting than for informing
foundations about strategy. In fact, few foundations have developed even the most rudimentary
methods for tracking grants in terms of strategy.
In our evaluation work, many foundations are
often unable to provide even basic data connecting individual grants to a strategy. One executive
we interviewed discovered this problem when he
asked program officers how much was invested
in each strategy. They didn’t know. In response,
the foundation began coding grants by strategy
and found that 55 percent of grants fell outside of
their articulated strategies.
The consequences for information management
are the tip of the iceberg if we consider how the
demands of foundation bureaucracy can undermine learning. Without a commitment to learning, the structure to support it, and the discipline
to act in response to what is learned, staff energy
and time is pulled in by a bureaucracy’s gravitational force.
Many foundations have not sufficiently shaped
the role of program staff to maximize learning
about strategy execution. For foundations to be
full strategists, this type of learning needs to be
more central to the work of program staff than it
appears to be at most foundations. In our interviews, foundation leaders readily acknowledged
that program staff members often “do not have
the time to learn.” Because foundations organize
themselves around making grants, program staff
can face enormous pressure to attend to the next
grant in the queue rather than review current efforts that are in the implementation phase – just
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when learning is most essential to adapt strategies to changing circumstances. It’s an imbalance
at the heart of what limits successful learning in
foundations.

Because foundations organize
themselves around making grants,
program staff can face enormous
pressure to attend to the next grant
in the queue rather than review
current efforts that are in the
implementation phase.
Challenge 4: Most Strategies Are Silent on the
Foundation’s Role
Foundation staff can speak easily about the ways
that they add value beyond dollars, including
their ability to convene, see the “big picture,” share
learning, and spread knowledge among grantees.
Yet most foundations are relatively silent on the
role to play in strategy as it is implemented.
Beyond funding grantees, most strategies focus
on what others will do. Little is specified about
the role or value the foundation will bring once
the strategy is in play. In fact, the strategy role is
often discussed as what the foundation will fund.
We wonder, then, if this is distinguished from the
practices of charitable bankers only by linkages
made to a theory of change as a rationale for the
grantmaking. This is, of course, important – but a
far cry from the more robust role that the “greats”
adopt in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.
For foundations to go beyond the rhetoric of
being more than “bankers,” they need to be far
clearer about what they do and the capacities they
need that can add value to advance strategy. They
must, in other words, develop and make explicit
their role, skills, and expertise – their strategic
competence – in supporting social change, and
apply it, learn from it, and improve it. Most
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foundations have given little specific attention to
building their organizations such that they can
effectively advance their aims.

understanding of the nonprofit sector and the
organizations within it, including how to assess
and promote leadership, governance, finance,
and human resources, among other things that
Nonetheless, most foundation executives have
shape nonprofit performance. It also requires a
views about the roles they should assume; the
deep understanding of the sector’s relationship
problem we see is that few have built and aligned with government. It knows how to purchase the
their organizations to match their visions. For
consultants and technical assistance that they
example, a foundation that seeks to be an “honest apply, and may adopt a capital financing strategy
broker” in contentious debates and works to bring or invest in the means to deliver performance
vested parties together to solve problems needs
information within the sector. Most importantly,
different capacities than those required by a foun- it has the capacity to select nonprofits that are exdation that aims to improve nonprofit organizacellent or have the potential to become excellent
tional effectiveness.
at delivering their core services.

While foundations may give
considerable thought to the kinds
of substantive knowledge they want
to acquire or build in specific fields,
such as health care or education,
they have been fairly agnostic in
considering the skills needed to be
active participants in the types of
strategy they put forward.
A foundation that seeks to fill an honest broker
role needs staff talented at negotiation and possessing political skills, and with a reputation that
holds clout with the vested parties. It needs the
capacities or resources that help to establish itself
as relatively neutral or at least prompted more
by evidence than ideology. Such a strategy might
include capacity to produce research, report
cards, and efforts to make systems more transparent, etc. Two foundations that we know well are
so committed to this role that they have brought
some of these functions in-house, thereby allowing them to control the quality and tone of
product reports.
A foundation that supports organizational effectiveness, on the other hand, requires deep
58

In light of these very different strategies and functions, these two foundations should be very different organizations – not just in their capacities,
but in terms of their time horizons, the nature of
their relationships, and the types and amounts of
resources they use. We imagine that these foundations differ, too, in how they structure grants
and whether and if they use loans to foster their
goals.
But what we have found is that while foundations
may give considerable thought to the kinds of
substantive knowledge they want to acquire or
build in specific fields, such as health care or education, they have been fairly agnostic in considering the skills needed to be active participants in
the types of strategy they put forward.
Foundations effective in strategic philanthropy
are those that not only articulate these roles about
how they add value, but also develop the core
competencies to successfully do so. With more
clarity about strategic role, a foundation has the
possibility, with experience, focused examination, and learning, to be able to hone its strategic
skill sets toward excellence, resulting in tangible
“value.”

Ten Years Later, Do Foundations Add More
Value?
Eleven years ago, Porter and Kramer (1999) challenged foundations to wrestle with the question of
how they create sufficient value to justify their tax
exemption. Someday, perhaps soon, someone will
ask again the question they raised – in essence:
THE
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Has philanthropy created the value to justify its
initial tax deduction and the tax relief it accrues
over time? In other words, are we achieving the
social benefit that is philanthropy’s promise?
History might judge philanthropy’s effort to
become more strategic in the decade since as
incomplete at best. To be sure, many more foundations have become more focused, embraced
new roles, applied more logic and clarity to their
work, and, generally, thought more about what it
means to be strategic. But how much value has
this added?
Porter and Kramer highlighted “value creating”
practices like selecting the best grantees, signaling other funders about grantee effectiveness,
improving grantee performance, and advancing
the state of knowledge and practice. These sound
practices should apply to all foundations, from
“charitable bankers” to “total strategists.”
But to maximize their effectiveness, foundations must go beyond these core practices. They
must, as Good to Great author Jim Collins urged
participants at the Center for Effective Philanthropy’s March 2009 conference, “attain piercing
clarity about how to produce the best long term
results” and identify what “you can be best in the
world at.”
Foundations have a ways to go in achieving this
clarity, if you consider one striking piece of research. In the Urban Institute’s 2004 study Foundation Effectiveness: Definitions and Challenges,
Francie Ostrower found:
Foundations typically defined what effectiveness
means in their foundations in highly general terms.
The wide-ranging answers given and comparatively
low percentages citing any one component testify to
the variability of definitions of effectiveness in the
field. The generality of the responses is indicative
of the fact that so many foundations have not really
thought through the specific meaning of effectiveness
within the context of their own institution (emphasis
added). (Ostrower, 2004, p 3.)

This study named what many already knew – that
the field had far to go toward articulating and re2011 Vol 2:3

alizing a vision of what effectiveness might mean,
and how to get there, for the individual foundation. Defining effectiveness within a foundation
will necessarily depend on the type of foundation
and its role in the strategic enterprise. Yet it is
possible and necessary, and the job of foundation
leaders. Foundations require this clarity from the
groups they fund; they should hold themselves to
no lower standard.

Ultimately, this responsibility comes
down to foundation leaders.
Ultimately, this responsibility comes down to
foundation leaders. They cannot merely adopt
theories of change, metrics, etc., and expect that
effectiveness will follow. They need to wrestle
with what their real value is and develop the
adaptive capacities to hone their competence at
delivering that value. They need to make changes
to their organizational structure to enable them
to work on the front lines of strategy. They need
to engage with grantees as full partners in developing and implementing strategy. They need to
get closer to implementation and work through
the implications of what they learn to improve
strategies as they evolve. Most of all, they need to
get better at learning and applying that learning
to strategy.
Foundation leaders deserve credit for seeking
more restraint and focus, be it through strategic
philanthropy or other means. We hope these
same leaders will confront the challenges raised
in this paper, including the lofty and unlikely expectations that are set, as well as the communications, structures, and other ways of working that
hamper their ability to be effective. This takes
discipline and time. It’s not an accident that Jim
Collins uses the word “discipline” repeatedly in
the course of his essay, Good to Great and the Social Sectors (2005). It is the key to building great
teams, ideas and, ultimately, great foundations.
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APPENDIX
The following foundations participated in the
May 2008 Strategy Forum: Annie E. Casey Foundation, Atlantic Philanthropies, Barr Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Bruner
Foundation, California Endowment, California
HealthCare Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of
New York, Cleveland Foundation, David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Duke Endowment, Edna
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